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Ien Ang writes of the “living-room war” as a war, between media outlets, for the market 
share, operating according to the logic of profitability.2 Driven by the logic of global 
capitalism, this living-room war is constantly infiltrating the living rooms for the “eyeball 
share” of the audiences. However, there is another aspect in the living-room war that Ang has 
written about in her audience studies but failed to engage, the “mind share” war. It is the 
purpose of this paper to examine the mind-share war as a “new living-room war” within the 
context of propaganda clashes between the Chinese state and Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa), a 
self-cultivation and quasi-religious practice banned in China since July 1999. I examine the 
new living-room war as a war of media campaigns between media outlets of two oppositional 
ideological camps (the Chinese state and Falun Gong). I argue that each side employs various 
media and deploys multiple strategies in visual representations to convince and persuade 
audiences in their living rooms in order to win their mind share.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented to the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia in Canberra 29 June-2 July 2004. It has been peer-reviewed and appears on the Conference 
Proceedings website by permission of the author who retains copyright. The paper may be downloaded 
for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation. 
2 Ien Ang, “Living-room wars: new technologies, audience measurement and the tactics of television 
consumption,” in Consuming Technologies: Media and Information in Domestic Spaces, edited by 
Roger Silversone and Eric Hirsch, London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Also see Ien Ang, Living 
Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World, London and New York: Routledge, 
1996. 
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“Media campaign war” refers to the systematic, sustained, and institutionalized propaganda 
clashes between two parties, through the ideological apparatuses of the media. It dwells upon 
ideological differences and works on representational conflicts. Both sides can be hegemonic 
and manipulative in the contestation of visuality. 
 
Most literature on Falun Gong, from both journalistic and academic fields, has been produced 
in recent years. The Chinese media, pro-government scientists and scholars have ardently 
denounced Falun Gong as an “evil cult,” and its practitioners “cultists” or innocent people 
blinded by the cult leader Li Hongzhi for his own personal gains who is aided by international 
(read: Western) anti-China hostile forces. Falun Gong’s ardent disciples would argue that Li 
is a modern-day prophet and represents an ultimate truth whose significance and global 
influence are comparable to that of Jesus, Buddha, and Mohammed. Western media and other 
third-party organizations, however, tend to associate Falun Gong and the persecution of Falun 
Gong with human rights and Chinas notorious human rights records.3 Scholars of Chinese 
studies in religion, history, and politics suggest that Falun Gong is an intriguing part of 
Chinese spiritual continuum, an integral part of Chinese cultural tradition and cultural 
revitalization movement, and an outgrowth of Chinas participation in global capitalism.4
 
My aim in this paper is not to offer any judgment or comment on the discursive contestations 
on the nature of Falun Gong. Nor do I intend to examine the complex historical, spiritual, 
religious, and political contexts of the appearance, growth, and transnational appeal of Falun 
Gong, which can be found elsewhere.5 Rather, I take Patsy Rahn’s advice to go “beyond the 
headlines” to look into the politics of representations of Falun Gong rather than the politics of 
Falun Gong itself. 6 In other words, I am not going to focus on how Falun Gong grows and 
varies within Chinese cultural and political traditions, or why media representations of Falun 
                                                 
3 Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in China immediately 
responded to the ban. Human Rights in China, “Crackdown on Falun Gong demonstrates clear 
violations of human rights,” 22 July 1999, available online from 
http://www.iso.hrichina.org.iso.news_item.adp?news_id=539 (accessed 24 March 2004); Human 
Rights Watch, “U.N. asked to intervene to protect Falun Gong’s members rights,” 22 July 1999, 
available online from http://www.hrw.org/press/199/jul/china2207.html (accessed 24 March 2004) 
4 David Ownby, Transnational China Project Commentary: “Falungong as a Cultural Revitalization 
Movement: An Historian Looks at Contemporary China”, available online from 
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~tnchina/commentary/ownby0398.html (accessed 25 November 2002); Li 
Lunsheng, “Falun Gong de shehui zongjiao yinsu” (Social and religious elements of Falun Gong), 
Zhengming, No. 264, September 1999. 
5 Besides studies done by established China scholars, students of religion, politics, and history are also 
contributing to the Falun Gong studies. For example, see Matthew John Noonan, “Spinning the 
Dharma Wheel: Towards a Reinterpretation of the Falun Gong,” MA thesis, University of Melbourne, 
2001, chapter three “The Internatinalisation of the Falun Gong.” Also see Matthew Glenn Thurgood, 
“China, Cults and International Relations: The Case of the Falun Gong,” MA thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 2003. 
6 Patsy Rahn, “The Falun Gong: Beyond the Headlines,” Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 17, 2000, p. 168. 
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Gong vary, but to problematize how the media representations of Falun Gong affect the 
everyday realities of contemporary China. 
 
Media-Campaign-War-Home 
 
Media, war, and campaign are closely related to and readily paired with one another, as in 
“media war,” “media campaign,” and “war campaign.” Media war can mean “media-plotted 
war” as shown in the “007” movie Tomorrow Never Dies, or “cultural war” staged in the 
media as exemplified in the generational politics of Australian intelligentsia.7 It can mean 
“information war,” the real warfare fought along the grids of technology, war facilitated by 
(and completely relying on) the technical media to store, transmit, analyze, and compute 
information of the war.8 It can also mean “war in the media” or mediated war, where the 
technologized gaze of the global media becomes a defining character of modern warfare.9 
Media war relates directly to political campaign or propaganda. The use of media as a tool 
and instrument of propaganda and spin, and a dissemination belt for officially managed war 
information has been an integral part of modern wars.10  
 
Thus media war can mean propaganda war where ideological and moral justifications are 
sought through media campaigns. In the aftermaths of the September-11 terrorists’ attacks, 
for example, American media were recruited in the arsenal of mass propaganda against 
terrorism. In the propaganda war that led to the war on terrorism and Iraq, President Bush 
                                                 
7 In Tomorrow Never Dies (2003, featuring Pierce Brosnan and Hong Kong/Malaysian Michelle Yeoh), 
a Western media mogul schemes to create a war between China and Britain in South China Sea. The 
collaboration between a British secret service agent and a Chinese agent uncovers the plot of the media 
war manufactured by the media mogul and prevents a military confrontation between the two powers. 
In Gangland: Cultural Elites and the New Generationalism (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997), Mark 
Davis writes that it is in the media that emerges “a Realpolitik of generationalism” where the elite/old 
generation occupies the trench to defend themselves and where the younger generation occupies a 
vantage point in their familiarity with new technologies and knowledge of the media and with media’s 
vulnerability to new ideas and changes. The media work puts the younger generation in a favorable 
position to intervene in the cultural hegemony that the cultural elites try to perpetuate. 
8 Friedrich A. Kittler, Literature, Media, Information systems, Amsterdam: OPA, 1997. 
9 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. Paul Patton, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997. 
10 Take America for example: Since the debacle in Vietnam when media reports contributed to the anti-
war public opinion and reversal of the war policy in the US (Pentagon blames the media coverage for 
their loss in Vietnam), a virtual merger between the military (government) and the media can be seen in 
Gulf Wars and War on Terrorism. The White House and the Pentagon have successfully framed media 
coverage of the warfares. See Danny Schechter, Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror, Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. The book examines the 
coverage of September 11 from mainstream US media networks and the government’s approach to 
manage propaganda during wartimes. 
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received a “meteoric boost,” as the media presented the President and his administration as 
safeguards of justice in its newly self-claimed role as the savior of “civilization.”11   
 
“Media campaign” is the most familiar strategy to address socio-political events staged and 
facilitated through the media by the political centers. The Gulf War for example is a media 
event as well as a propaganda event for the American government and its military.12 Media 
campaign/propaganda has been a defining character of Chinese media culture. Mass media 
have been playing a central role in mass mobilizations since the May-Fourth movements in 
1919, the onset of revolutions in modern China. From its earliest days the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has recognized and tried to harness the power of the mass media to 
propagate its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the populace for its socialist 
revolutionary programs.13 The media remain a powerful machinery of governmentality and 
ideological apparatus in propagating the “thought work” even after the “propaganda state” has 
loosened (not lost) control over the “spiritual civilization” in post-Mao eras.14 The return of 
Hong Kong in 1997, for example, can be viewed as a global media spectacle manipulated by 
the Chinese government as a propaganda campaign for domestic and international 
audiences.15  
 
But media are themselves neutral entities and mediums of communication. Following 
Foucault, we can say that the power of the media resides not with those who design the media 
but those who use them.16 In mobilizing large groups of people to take to the streets and 
squares, to support or oppose certain political agendas, and participate in symbolically 
charged performances as a group, community, or a nation, the mass media remain effective 
ways “to challenge or defend the legitimacy of those who claim to embody the political 
                                                 
11 Danny Schechter, Media Wars, p. 13. 
12 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, c1992. 
13 J. Hawkins, Mass Communication in China, London: Longman, 1982; B. Womack ed, Media and 
the Chinese Public: A Survey of the Beijing Media Audience, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986. 
Franklin W. Houn, To change a Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China, East 
Lansting, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1961. 
14 Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed 
China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
15 Chin-Chuan Lee, Joseph Man Chan, Zhongdang Pan, and Clement Y.K. So, Global Media 
Spectacle: News War Over Hong Kong, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 
16 The exercise of power in media mobilization can be seen in the student protestors on Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 who skillfully utilized the popular media at home and Western media to propagate their 
democracy-champion-turned-victims-of-violence images. A more recent case is the popular use of the 
media (the new media especially) during the 2003 SARS outbreak in China to advance an agenda of 
antithesis and promote socio-political changes. (See my article “Talking, Linking, Clicking: The 
Politics of AIDS and SARS,” Positions, forthcoming.) 
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center.”17 When a counter media campaign is staged mobilizing a vast range of social and 
human capital to propagate an alternative system of “thought work,” media campaigns and 
media wars are merged into a total (media) war, the media campaign war. 
 
Media campaign wars are actualized beyond the “three contractual partners” (organizers, 
media producers and audience) that Dayan and Katz suggest of in media events.18 There is a 
fourth one: rivals or opponents. Unlike media events that celebrate reconciliation rather than 
conflict, media campaign wars dwell upon and highlight differences and conflicts. Both sides 
can be hegemonic and manipulative in their strategies and performances. And both sides are 
organizers, producers, and performers in the media campaigns. The systematic, sustained, and 
institutionalized propaganda clashes between the Chinese state and Falun Gong is such a case 
in point. 
 
Since April 25 1999, Falun Gong, or rather the persecution of Falun Gong, has made 
headlines of the world media as “the event” when tens of millions of Falun Gong followers 
surrounded Zhongnanhai, the Chinese equivalence of Kremlin, in protest of unfair treatments 
by the official media and police. The April-25 event becomes the onset of continuous clashes 
between Falun Gong and the Chinese government. The technologized gaze of the media 
transmits the real politics of the streets, Zhongnanhai, and Tiananmen Square into the living 
rooms of spectators and transforms the media campaign war into a media spectacle.19  
 
Postmodern obsession and saturation with media spectacles has seen the blurring of the 
boundary between the private and the public. Media event, for example, transforms the home 
into a public space, according to Dayan and Katz.20 The consequence is the blurring between 
the “domesticated politics” and the “politics of the domestic.” In the former, there is a long 
tradition of criticism and bemoaning on the transformation of the private individual from a 
member of the public (citizen) to a private consumer. From the Frankfurt School, Jurgen 
Habermas to post-Habermas public-sphere critics, modernists have lamented over the loss of 
the “public citizen” and the “public sphere” in the mass media saturated “society of the 
                                                 
17 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Mass Media and Mass Actions,” in Media and Revolution: Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Jeremy D. Popkin, The University Press of Kentucky, 1995, p. 214. 
18 Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events:  The Live Broadcasting of History, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
19 Chinese media, Falun Gong, and third-party media (mainly Western media) responded to the clashes 
between the State and the “cult” with numerous “headline” reports. The electronic media have 
especially played an important role in transmitting the Realpolitik of the streets into a media spectacle 
in the domestic. In this paper I focus on the constructing (and performing) the media spectacle by the 
Chinese state and Falun Gong. I examine Western media’s role in constructing the media spectacle in a 
separate paper. 
20 Dayan and Katz, Media Events, pp. 127-133. 
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spectacle,”21 where the Realpolitik is dominated by the logic of capitalism and becomes 
domesticated.22 At the same time there are others who celebrate the arrival of the latter, the 
politics of the domestic. J.B. Thompson for example writes of the rise of mediated quasi-
interaction and mediated publicness as new options and new dynamics offered to an 
individual for self-experimentation and social intervention.23 John Fiske, following the 
everyday politics thesis of Michael de Certeau, celebrates the popular culture based on the 
pleasure of consumption in the domestic.24 What the postmodernists suggest is that it is the 
media’s mediation of political life and public affairs that constitutes the significant factor of a 
private consumer-citizen’s relation to the society and the world as a whole. It is in the 
everyday life of the living room that “[a]gency and modernity (and post-modernity) meet” 
and “that meeting is expressed in the ideology and activity of consumption.”25  
 
Consuming media spectacles becomes the defining feature of our postmodern everyday 
realities of the domestic. In the postmodern media culture, targeting the “living rooms” is 
both for the “eyeball share” (market share) and the “mind share” (public opinion). The wars 
for “eyeball share” and “mind share” are in fact integrated in the political economy of the 
postmodern media culture. But the singularity of the media campaign war between the 
(Chinese) State and Falun Gong rests not in the integration but in the split of the “mind share” 
war and the “eyeball share” war. As discussed in the following, presenting the war to 
audiences in their living rooms is less about the consumption of the media and voyeurism 
than the manipulation of the media and the play on visuality politics on the part of the 
Chinese state and Falun Gong for their moral and ideological justifications.26
 
The State’s Media Campaign 
 
The Chinese government has staged a massive media campaign against the “cult” since July 
1999. The living rooms of the Chinese were bombarded with messages from both print and 
                                                 
21 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, New York: Zone Books, 1994. 
22 There is a huge body of literature on the emergence of domesticated politics. Jurgen Habermas’ The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989) is a piece of 
masterwork to start with. 
23 John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995. 
24 John Fiske, Television Culture, London and New York: Routledge, 1987. 
25 Roger Silverstone, Television and Everyday Life, London and New York:Routledge, p 174. 
26 It should be noted that, while the Chinese state regards Falun Gong as a “cult,” Falun Gong also talks 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a “cult.” The media campaign war between the two parties 
is therefore a war on “cults.” An example on the CCP as a cult can be found in “special edition” of New 
Epoch (a Falun Gong weekly in Australia), “yige qinghua xuexi de diedang rensheng,” [life of a 
Qinghua graduate: Awakening from the lies of Red Dynasty—To all Chinese fellowmen] written by 
Zhao Ming (handout during the 5th anniversary of April-25 incident, 2004). 
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electronic media, especially in the first few months after the banning on Falun Gong on 22 
July. The Chinese government has mobilized all sorts of media to demonize Falun Gong and 
reiterate its anti-cult themes, while arresting thousands of Falun Gong followers who refuse to 
renounce their beliefs.  Television, radio, and print media join the media campaign on cults, 
with China Central Television (CCTV) and Peoples Daily taking the lead. Television plays a 
central role in the anti-Falun Gong and anti-cults media campaign.  
 
 
Cartoons on Li Hongzhi and Falun Gong from Chinese official publications:  
Left: “The entire world must heed me, otherwise it’s nothing. If I cannot save you, no one else can.”  
Right: In an accident, one person shouts “Let’s rush him to hospital!” The female Falun Gong follower blocks the 
way of the ambulance and medical worker, “Don’t worry about him. Master Li will protect him.” Available from 
http://www2kenyon.edu/Depts/Religion/Fac/Adler/Reln270/FalunGong/22.htm (accessed on 20 March 2004) 
 
In the weeks following the crackdown, thirty-minute evening news became one-hour anti-
Falun Gong special reports, followed by more lengthy investigative news and news analyses 
to strengthen the “keynote tune” (zhu xuanlu) of the major news reports. Wherever one turned 
there were posters and signs denouncing the “cult;” on every channel one tuned to there were 
reports to de-legitimize Falun Gong as an “evil cult” or “killer cult” and discredit its leader Li 
Hongzhi as an archetypal doomsday cult leader with an under-rated educational level, a 
criminal and corrupt swindler amassing a large fortune (on which he did not pay taxes), and a 
pawn of international forces hostile to China and Chinese. The Chinese government uses 
strategies that combine exposing Falun Gong’s unscientific nature with anti-cult 
pronouncements borrowed from the counter-cult movements in other countries to denounce 
Li and Falun Gong. A barrage of media reports link the “cult” to the Branch Davidians, the 
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Japanese Aum Shinryko, Jim Jones’ Solar Temple, and the “Restore the Ten 
Commandments” sect in Uganda to justify the banning on Falun Gong.27   
 
In the mean time, the Chinese government is increasingly using the Internet to attack Li and 
Falun Gong. It has set up anti-Falun Gong websites and encouraged major Internet service 
providers to set up anti-Falun Gong web pages. Extensive articles have been written and 
transmitted over the cyberspace.28 These web sites or pages are generally the electronic 
versions of the mainstream media, with hyperlinks to other anti-cult sites and more detailed 
descriptions of state regulations and statements. At the same time, all Falun Gong and pro-
Falun Gong websites are blocked and inaccessible from China. Anybody who uses the 
Internet to disseminate pro-Falun Gong messages or provide email services to (suspected) 
Falun Gong activists is arrested under the crime of “subversion of the state.” Noticing that 
users can circumvent its firewall by using a proxy server, the government is making every 
intelligent attempt to control the “uncontrollable” by strengthening the team of cyber-police 
to regulate Internet cafes and find cyber-dissidents.29 It invests time and money in acquiring 
and developing new software and hardware to control the Internet content,30 and even 
employs hackers to attack Falun Gong websites.31  
 
                                                 
27 As claimed by the Chinese government, the banning of Falun Gong “not only complies with 
international rights instruments but also follows the common practice of all other governments in the 
world regarding cults”. See “Chinese Ambassador defends government banning of Falun Gong,” 
Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2000, available online from http://ppFalun 
Gong.china.com.cn/baodao/200322/01e.html (accessed 9 January 2004)  
28 See official anti-cults and anti-Falun Gong websites in “Appendix.” 
29 Cyber-police arrest democracy organizers, human-rights activists, Falun Gong members, scholars, 
and other cyber activists. See Nina Hachigian, “China’s Cyber Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, 
March/April 2001, available from http://www.rand.org/nsrd/capp/cyberstrategy.html (accessed 
September 2002). CCTV reported that in November 2001 five Falun Gong diehards were arrested and 
sentenced for illegally setting up a Falun Gong website, dissemination of Falun Gong literature and 
compact disks in Xinjiang, available from www.yangqing.com.cn/1m/851/12/74229.html (accessed 
November 2003) 
30 Greg Sinclair, “The Internet in China: Information Revolution or Authoritarian Solution?” available 
from http://www.geocities.com/gelaige70/Falun Gong.pdf (accessed 15 March 2004) 
31 Hacking and counter-hacking are inglorious actions that neither party would admit openly. Despite 
the denial from the Chinese government, there are reports in western media that Falun Gong websites 
experienced hacking, and many of the hackings were found originated from Chinese police bureau or 
the Public Security Ministry. See, for example, AP, July 31, 1999. Regarding Falun Gong hacking 
Chinese official websites, I have not seen any report so far. But my experience working as a journalist 
in Chinese official media tells me that there are cases of Falun Gong hacking Chinese official websites. 
The website of the television station I once worked with (www.jstv.com) was hacked once by Falun 
Gong, but the hacking incident was kept at a low profile, and only stayed with the IT administrator, the 
station boss, and provincial public security bureau. 
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The “market logic,” stressed repeatedly in the commercialization of the media and cultural 
industries, has given way to the “party logic” in the virulent media campaign on “cults.”32 It 
carries a high price tag: millions of dollars, time, and people have been involved in the anti-
Falun Gong and anti-cult campaign. CCTV alone lost more than 60 million yuan  
(approximately USD 7.5 million) of its revenue from advertisements in the anti-Falun Gong 
campaign in July 1999,33 which did not include the hours, people, equipment, and money 
spent to produce the media bombardment. The high price of the media war on Falun Gong, 
however, is not without paid-off results. Visual media have tremendous power to influence 
public opinions. Television images of victims of Falun Gong and their testimonials created a 
direct impact on television audiences. The images of deformed bodies of self-immolators at 
the Tiananamen Square in January 2001 further dispelled doubt, indifference, or even 
antagonism to the anti-cult campaign in many Chinese living rooms. Television images of 
emotionally charged hospital scenes of victims of self-immolation, repeated (contrasting) 
images of the college student and the primary-school girl before and after the incident rang 
true to many audiences that “the nature of Falun Gong is cult that destroys lives” and “the 
Party’s decision [to ban Falun Gong and other cults] is wise, correct, and timely.” 34
               
e
r
Book cover of “Combat Cults and Protect Human Ri
(accessed 20 March 2004); photos of burnt face, han
March 2004) 
 
Observers view the vitriolic media campaig
offensive, reminiscent in its intensity to the
                                                 
32 For a study of the “market logic” and the “pa
Democracy in China: Between the Party Line a
Illinois Press, 1998. 
33 Zhang Yong, “From Masses to Audience: Ch
China”, Journalism Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2000,
34 From CCTV’s investigative news program “N
Destruction,” broadcast on 30 January 2001. 
 AfteBefor 
ghts,” from CCTV official website www.yangqing.com.cn 
d and arm are from www.mingjing.com.cn (accessed 20 
n against “cults” as “a saturation-propaganda 
 strident sloganeering of the Cultural Revolution, 
rty logic,” see Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and 
nd the Bottom Line, Urbana and Chicago: University of 
anging Media Ideologies and Practices in Reform 
 p. 626. 
ews Focus” (jiaodian fangtan): “Cult Nature, Life 
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in which millions were punished for being of the wrong class or consciousness.”35 The 
expansion from the anti-Falun Gong campaign to a broader anti-cult campaign that 
encompasses a wide range of unofficial religious and spiritual groups and heterodox sects 
indicates how seriously Chinese officials view any obstacles to its vision of economic and 
social progress, order, and legitimacy.36 In face of numerous criticisms from world leaders 
and human rights organizations, China’s media campaign on cults has increasingly resorted to 
universally recognized terminologies such as human rights and the rule of law.37 As the title 
of the feature program from CCTV’s anti-Falun Gong website suggests, China’s war on Falun 
Gong is staged within the bounds of law and international practices to “combat cults and 
protect human rights.”  
 
Falun Gong’s Media Campaign 
 
In face of the victimization and persecution from the Chinese government, Falun Gong stages 
a counter media campaign, to reveal the “truth” about itself and “what’s happening in China.”  
Raising awareness of Falun Gong and the persecution of Falun Gong in China to world 
audiences has become the gist of the “Fa-rectification,” a term that has been widely used by 
Falun Gong followers to incorporate “studying and validating the Fa” (Falun Dafa), 
“clarifying the truth,” and “sending forth righteous thoughts” (spreading the Fa and offer 
salvation to all human beings).38 Li Hongzhi and his followers are media savvy and highly 
media conscious. They utilize their own global media networks of the Internet, newspapers, 
magazines, media production studios, radio and television broadcasts to produce and 
distribute newsletters, leaflets, booklets, and VCDs to individuals and households, so as to 
“send forth righteous thoughts” to the world. 
 
Inside China Falun Gong followers have changed their strategies from a high-profile 
showdown in protests and demonstrations outside state media institutions and on Tiananmen 
Square to a guerrilla media warfare with the regime. They send a barrage of mysterious, 
automated voice messages praising Falun Gong to mainland phones; they slip pro-Falun 
Gong content into official Chinese newspapers; and they break into local terrestrial television 
broadcasts and sabotage local cable TV transmission lines to relay their own printed 
                                                 
35 Danny Schechter, Falun Gong’s Challenge to China, p. 11 
36 Nancy N. Chen, “Healing Sects and Anti-Cult Campaigns,” The China Quarterly, 2003, pp.505-520. 
Jason Kindopp, “China’s War on ‘Cult’,” Current History, Sep 2002, pp. 259-266. 
37 Ronald C. Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, “The ‘Falun Gong Problem’: Politics and the Struggle for the Rule 
of Law in China,” The China Quarterly, 2003, pp.623-642. 
38 E.g. “To Fellow Practitioners (updated September 7, 2002)” from 
http://clearwisdom.net/emh/msg11.html (accessed 23 March 2003) 
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material.39 They hijack the Sinosat satellite signals to insert pro-Falun Gong videos and 
slogans to the mainland audiences. CCTV and CETV (China Education Television), the only 
two national television networks, were both hijacked. During the World Cup soccer finals 
between 23 June and 30 June 2002, nine CCTV channels and at least ten provincial TV 
channels were hijacked by Falun Gong. Since then on almost every important occasion, such 
as the anniversaries of Hong Kong’s return to China, the National Day, the Spring Festival, 
and more recently celebrations on China’s first spaceman project, Falun Gong has broken into 
the state media vectors to stage a high-profile counter media campaign.40  
 
Falun Gong members justify their actions as a “truth clarification” war against the “evil” 
Jiang (Zemin) regime that lies and fabricates news to Chinese and international audiences, 
even though they directly result in more virulent media campaigns against Falun Gong from 
the Chinese government using the satellite hijacking as a “new evidence of crime” to reiterate 
anti-Falun Gong themes—Falun Gong is anti-society, anti-human, anti-science, anti-China, 
and anti-international standards and rules.41  
 
 
One of a series of 
caricatures on “Evil Jiang 
Zemin.” Second man on the 
left: “Chinese government 
has killed more than 270 
Falun Gong practitioners. 
Where are Chinese people’s 
human rights?!” Jiang 
Zemin (in the middle) 
answers: “Our country is in 
its best human rights period 
in history.” First man on the 
left: “You are so 
shameless!” From 
http://www.clearwisdom/ne
t/emh/articles/2001/9/5/135
58.html (accessed 20 March 
2004) 
 
                                                 
39 Since 2002 Falun Gong followers had broken into local terrestrial television broadcasts in North-east 
China and hacked into cable television networks in half-a-dozen different cities including Laiyang, 
Yantai, Chongqing, Changchun and Harbin. David Murphy, “China—mixing signals”, Far Eastern 
Economic Review 11/07/2002. Also see “Falun Gong saboteurs nabbed in Jilin,” People’s Daily, 
available from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ (accessed on 20 January 2004) 
40 For Chinese official account of Falun Gong satellite hijacking incidents, see “special reports” from 
http://www.zhengqing.net.cn/weixing/index.htm (accessed on 24 March 2004). 
41 “New evidence of crime of the Falun Gong cult,” People’s Daily, 9 July 2002. Also see “feifa 
ganrao, ruyi pohai” [Illegal disruption and intentional destruction] and “Falun Gong caici gongji wo xin 
nuo weixing” [Falun Gong attacks our Sinosat again], broadcast on 8 July 2002 and 24 September 2002 
by “News Focus,” CCTV. 
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On news fabrication in 
Chinese media. Nurse: “We 
will waive your medical bill if 
you say the words written on 
the paper.” The paper on the 
body of the patient reads: “I 
practice Falun Gong.” A 
cameraman is ready to record 
it as the “1400th truth on 
Falun Gong.” From 
http://www.clearwisdom.net/e
mh/articles/2001/12/18/16916.
htm (accessed 20 March 2004)
 
Outside China, Falun Gong keeps a close eye on the Western media by encouraging Western 
media outlets to use less pejorative language (as in changing terms “cult” to more neutral ones 
such as “sect” or “movement”) and to present a favorable image of it. At the same time it is 
vigilant of Chinese media coverage and refutes every accusation on itself and its members by 
producing alternative explanations and audio-video materials on the same event or issue 
through dissecting Chinese official news programs. “A Staged Tragedy: Self-Immolation in 
Tiananmen Square—Analysis of CCTV’s Video Tape of January 23, 2001,” one of Falun 
Gong’s “truth clarification” series, is such an example. It dissects CCTV news footage on the 
Tiananmen self-immolation incident to refute accusations by the Chinese government and use 
it as evidence of news fabrication by the Chinese state media to stage a counter media 
campaign around the world.42
 
In the counter media campaign, Falun Gong poses itself not only as a media-watcher, analyst, 
and dissector but also a self-promoter and public relations expert. Falun Gong followers seek 
every opportunity to gain moral support from international organizations, local governments, 
businesses, and the general public by making themselves visible in public places and on 
public occasions. They put up signs on campuses, set up booths and do their slow-movement 
practices in public places, pass out flyers, participate in parades, organize and attend press 
conferences, obtain Falun Dafa proclamations from local governments, talk to anyone who is 
willing to listen about Falun Gong and the persecution of Falun Gong by the Chinese 
government. They organize global vigilance and march for victims of persecution by the 
Chinese government; they put former Chinese president Jiang Zemin on trial. What Falun 
Gong shows is an opposite story from the Chinese official media: Jiang Zemin is a big liar 
and his media machinery makes news based on lies. 
                                                 
42 The video is made into VCD and distributed free around the world. It is also accessible from major 
Falun Gong websites. For example: www.minghui.org/mh/articles/2001/10/1/17092.html, 
www.clearwisdom.net/emh/special_column/self-immolation.html (accessed 20 March 2004) 
  
 13
 
Falun Gong’s counter media campaign poses a threat and challenge to China’s state-centered 
media culture. Its highly transnational visibility differentiates it from other religious/qigong 
movements in China. Its global vision and visibility directly relate to and result from its 
strategic use of the media, especially with the Internet.   
 
Many observers have noted Falun Gong’s high-profile presence on the Internet.43  Danny 
Schetcher, for example, points out that the Falun Gong story appears to be “as much about 
technology as it is about religion; it offers a fascinating glimpse of an ancient religious 
tradition that is mutating rapidly as it makes the leap into cyberspace.”44 The extensive use of 
new media and communication technologies distinguishes Falun Gong from earlier popular 
(religious) movements. Falun Gong’s Internet savvy is a crucial factor in its ability to survive 
and even prevail over the persecution by the Chinese government both in and outside China. 
Since its first website established in 1995, the number of Falun Gong websites has grown 
quickly. Falun Gong is now thoroughly wired, with websites all over the world in major 
languages (the majority are in both English and Chinese).45
 
The Internet is a tool of teaching, communicating, organizing, and mobilizing global 
membership, as well as counteracting the Chinese government’s propaganda war. The April 
25 (1999) mass congregation at Zhongnanhai is said to be such an incidence of cyber-
organization for concerted actions.46 Cyberspace also constitutes an important part of being a 
Falun Gong practitioner. Noah Porter’s ethnographic study of Falun Gong practitioners in 
America finds that they either look at Falun Gong sites regularly (ideally on a daily basis), or 
read articles of the sites via subscribed emails when they do not have direct access to the sites, 
especially for those living in China.47 Because of the centrality of the Internet in its operation, 
                                                 
43 For examples, see John Wong, “The mystery of Falun Gong: Its rise and fall in China,” in The 
Mystery of China’s Falun Gong: Its Rise and Its Sociological Implications, Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing Co., 1999; Stephen D. O’Leary, “Falun Gong and the Internet,” in Falun Gong’s 
Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or “Evil Cult,” a report and reader by Danny Schechter, New 
York: Akashic Books, 2000; Lin Man, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001; Noah Porter, “Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic 
Studies,” MA thesis, University of South Florida, 2003;. 
44 Danny Schechter, Falun Gong’s Challenge to China, 2000, p. 190. 
45 See Appendix for selected Falun Gong websites. 
46 Lin Nan, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, p.224. 
47 Noah Porter, “Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Studies,” MA thesis, University of 
South Florida, 2003, p. 227. 
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Falun Gong is described by Karaflogka as a kind of “New Cyberreligious Movements,” 
(NCRMs)48 and by Thornton a kind of “new cybersects.”49
 
The tactical integration of the oldest means of communication (oral and print media) with the 
newest media (the Internet) has sustained Falun Gong as “the movement” in the postmodern 
culture of the media. Whether as “the event” or “the movement,” Falun Gong has inaugurated 
a new era in Chinese political media culture.  Never before in the history of the PRC has any 
organization, group, or party been able to pose such an open challenge to the regime of the 
CCP through the power of transnational visuality as Falun Gong does.50 For third-party 
audiences, this war of representations may look like another spectacle China presents at the 
turn of the new millennium (similar to watching Tiananmen violence in 1989). But to the two 
parties involved in the warfare, especially to Falun Gong, presenting the war to transnational 
audiences is more than meeting their voyeurism. It is a strategy of “flexible accumulation” in 
terms of social capital.51 As Nan Lin points out, Falun Gong serves as “a vivid contemporary 
illustration of how social networks and capital provide the mechanisms and processes by 
which an alternative ideology, challenging prevailing ideology and institutions, can be 
institutionalized.”52 Falun Gong’s concerted and consistent efforts to stage the counter media 
campaign with the Chinese government is an illustration of how an oppositional group is 
institutionalizing its ideology through social and media networks, of how cybernetworking 
can mobilize and accumulate social capital over space and time, and sustain an alternative 
ideology in a global context. 
 
The Continual War  
 
Falun Gong’s counter media campaign—through its own media production, cybernetworking, 
news analysis and dissection, media infiltration and hacking, combined with extensive PR 
                                                 
48 Karaflogka’s definition of NCRMs is: “New because they address issues using a new medium and 
introducing new possibilities; Cyberreligious because they mainly exist and function on-line; 
Movements because they can, potentially, mobilize and activate the entire human population.” 
Anastasia Karaflogka, “Religious Discourse and Cyberspace,” Religion 32, 2002, p. 286. 
49 Patricia M. Thornton, “The New Cybersects: Resistance and Repression in the Reform Era,” in 
Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2003 (2nd ed.). 
50 I have a separate paper on the visuality politics of Falun Gong. 
51 “Flexible accumulation” describes the new modus operandi of late capitalism as opposed to the 
rigidity of Fordism. Since David Harvey proposed the concept in 1990, it has become one of the central 
terms to map political, economic, and cultural conditions of transnational capitalism. Aihwa Ong’s 
conceptualization of “flexible citizenship,” for example, is a successful attempt in appropriating 
Harvey’s “flexible accumulation” for her human-agency-centered “cultural logics of transnationality.” 
See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, 
Blackwell, 1990; Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 1999. 
52 Nan Lin, Social Capital, p. 225. 
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efforts—makes itself a declared oppositional force to the ruling of the CCP in China. In 
attacking and counter attacking (such as the Internet and satellite hackings), both sides bring 
their media campaigns upfront in seeking and justifying their ideological legitimacies. 
China’s war on the “cult” started from the media, mouthpiece of the Party, long before the 
crackdown on Falun Gong.53 Falun Gong’s war with the Chinese state also started with the 
media, long before the news-headline event of the April-25 Zhongnanhai demonstration in 
1999, which is itself a counter-measure of Falun Gong against the state media 
disinformation.54 The confrontation between Falun Gong and the state grew into a media 
campaign war after July 1999, whereafter the State becomes more virulent and tactical in 
demonizing Falun Gong and Falun Gong more political and oppositional towards the State 
and its ideological apparatuses.  
 
The war has mixed effects on audiences at the home terminals. A survey by “The Voices of 
China” finds that overseas Chinese in America generally hold negative opinions about Falun 
Gong, especially about its founder and leader Li Hongzhi, though they are equally critical of 
Chinese government’s actions against Falun Gong.55  Due to the lack of access and data, there 
has been no survey done on mainland Chinese’s opinions on the (anti-)Falun Gong campaign, 
except for observations and speculations. Many people in the West doubt the effectiveness of 
the Chinese state’s media campaign.56 However, my observations during my trips to China in 
2002, 2003, and 2004 suggest that the majority of my respondents are either indifferent to or 
support the government’s crackdown on Falun Gong and cults. The massive media campaign 
                                                 
53 The state regulation of religion and qigong practices is mainly maintained in the balance between 
autonomy and loyalty (to the Party and socialism) and it has issued new regulations and laws to control 
beliefs since the 1980s. The state media has been instrumental in propagating the state policies. Since 
1995 the attack on qigong among intellectual (scientific) circles has expanded into the state media, 
who, as mouthpieces of the ruling elite, join the state-sanctioned scientific efforts to identify scientific 
qigong and anti- or pseudo-scientific qigong. For regulations of religion, see Pitman B. Potter, “Belief 
in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” The China Quarterly, 2003, pp. 317-337. For intellectual 
anti-qigong accounts, see Jinan Xu, “Body, Discourse, and the Cultural Politics of Contemporary 
Chinese Qigong,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 58: 4, 1999, pp. 965-66. 
54 Falun Gong has been media conscious and sensitive to criticism by the media. Falun Gong staged 
several large-scale protests against unfavorable media coverage in Tianjin, Beijing, Jinan, and other 
cities when it still legally existed in China. Falun Gong followers also made repeatedly phone calls and 
visits to journalists who were responsible for the unfavorable articles, forcing them to change phone 
numbers or hide away. The April-25 demonstration in 1999 is a direct result of an article written by He 
Zuoxiu, a physicist, who warned the youth against practicing Falun Gong. Falun Gong followers 
demonstrated outside the publishing house demanding a withdrawal of the article and an open apology 
from the author and the journal. The police came in and arrested several Falun Gong demonstrators. 
The whole event led to the Zhongnanhai demonstration in Beijing, which triggers the subsequent 
crackdown on Falun Gong and anti-cult campaigns.  
55 Mei Lu (The Voices of Chinese), “The Controversy about Falun Gong: What Do Chinese People 
Think?” available online from http://www.voicesofchinese.org/falun/surveyrpt.shtml (accessed 17 May 
2004). The survey is done via email correspondence among educated Chinese studying or working in 
the US (most with a university degree). 
56 John Schauble, “Chinese tire of anti-cult media blitz,” The Age, 10 February 2001, p. 27. 
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on the self-immolation tragedy of January 2001 was effective in winning more people over to 
the official line, especially those who held doubt and antagonism over the Party’s 
overreaction in the beginning. Considering the fact that patriotism-cum-nationalism has been 
the central theme of media campaigns in China for more than two decades now and that 
Chinese media are still characterized by “many mouths but one voice,”57 it is understandable 
that conservatism characterizes the popular response toward the campaigns on Falun Gong 
(and cults in general).  
 
My observations conform to those of some Western observers such as Barend J. Ter Haar and 
Schechter who note that, though many in China are sick of the media campaign against Falun 
Gong, many others have been bought into the ceaseless one-sided propaganda.58 The current 
Chinese government is turning its attention to trade and international disputes and domestic 
developmental problems, and trying to keep the Falun Gong issue in a low profile in the 
public sphere. But Falun Gong remains a sensitive issue in the public discourse.59 The media 
keep a constant alert to Falun Gong infiltration, especially after the satellite hijacking 
incidents, making most journalists wary and weary of Falun Gong.60  
 
It appears that “China’s war on ‘cults’ has only just begun,”61 and that the war has 
increasingly staged on the transnational level, targeting paradiasporic audiences. After the ban 
on Falun Gong in China in 1999, Falun Gong has become a transnational force and face of 
globalizing Chinese cultural tradition and political dissidence at the same time. As a result, 
the state’s anti-cult media campaign has also gone offshore. There are lots of reports from 
Falun Gong literature (both online and offline) on the harassment of Dafa practitioners, 
supporters, and sympathizers in oversea countries (including document thefts and jamming of 
                                                 
57 I have written on the political culture of Chinese media and journalism in the new “media industry’ 
reforms in a separate essay. I argue that Chinese media may have many mouths singing different tunes 
in non-news and non-political sectors but voicing the same tune coming from the same head of the 
CCP on political issues. 
58 Barend ter Haar, “Falun Gong: Evaluation and Further References,” available from 
http://sun.sino.uniheidelberg.de/staff/bth/falun.htm (accessed 15 October 2003); Danny Schechter, 
Falun Gong’s Challenge to China, pp. 74-75. 
59 People are generally sensitive to the topic of Falun Gong in China. Whenever I mentioned Falun 
Gong in China (especially when I said I was doing research on Falun Gong), there were either 
weird/puzzled or alert expressions on their faces. My family and friends in China refuse to mention 
Falun Gong on the phone for fear of phone tapping by the security offices. Falun Gong is a taboo even 
in academic conferences. My mentioning of Falun Gong at an international conference in Beijing in 
June 2004 caused a wave of uneasiness among Chinese participants. 
60 After the satellite hijackings, all broadcasting outlets in China are required to have a “responsibility 
system:” anyone who allows pro-Falun Gong news piece or comments to slip into the programs 
(especially live broadcast and audience participation/talk radio programs) faces several punishment that 
normally leads to the loss of job/position, self-criticism sessions, and a deterrence to career 
development and promotion.  
61 Jason Kindopp, “China’s War on ‘Cults’,” Current History, Sep 2002, p. 266. 
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phone calls) by Chinese embassies and intelligence staff, and on curtailments of Falun Gong 
activities by their host country governments under pressures from the Chinese government. 
Both Falun Gong and Chinese embassies around the world deliver free video and print 
materials and organize “truth” media conferences to justify their moral, legal, and ideological 
stands. The recent “mind-share theft” incident of the New Tang Dynasty Television 
(NTDTV) by the CCTV during the 2004 Chinese New Year celebrations is an illustration of 
how the media campaign war becomes integrated into Beijing’s cross-border media 
campaigns.62 Beijing’s clashes with Falun Gong reverberate “here” at home both inside China 
and outside China. 
 
The media campaign war between Falun Gong and the Chinese state continues to tell a tale of 
two representations and two narratives. Both camps mobilize and resort to new media and 
communication tools to attack and counter-attack. The media campaign war has become a site 
of “maximum turbulence” and “maximum visibility” in which the social, cultural and political 
dimensions of Chinese modernity are maximized and magnified.63  
 
 
Appendix: selected websites from Chinese official sources and Falun Gong 
 
Chinese official anti-Falun Gong and anti-cult websites 
www.zhengqing.net.cn (provides useful links to all major anti-Falun Gong sites in China, 
including the following links; also included are “News Focus” (CCTV) anti-Falun Gong 
series reports) 
www.yangqing.com.cn (owned by CCTV) 
www.qiming.org.cn (owned by People’s Daily, also accessible from 
www.people.com.cn/GB/other6902/index.html) 
www.mingjing.org.cn
www.zhihui.com.cn (a solely English anti-Falun Gong site) 
www.anticult.org
www.gmw.com.cn/z_zhuanti/flg/flg.htm  
                                                 
62 On the night of 24 January 2004 between 12pm to 3am Washington-based Channel 56 (a Chinese 
language TV channel) saw its much-advertised inaugural Chinese New Year Global Gala programs 
produced by NTDTV replaced by the CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala. It is later found out that a media 
spy of the Chinese state had infiltrated Channel 56 and facilitated the “mind share” theft incident. See 
“Zhong gong shentou meiti, hua fu 56 tai xin tan ren jiemu bei ‘diaobao’” [The CCP infiltrates the 
media, NDTTV programs on Washington-based Channel 56 ‘swapped’], The New Epoch, 6 February 
2004. 
63 The two terms are borrowed from John Fiske, Media Matters: Everyday Culture and Political 
Change, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 7. 
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Falun Gong’s websites 
www.minghui.org and its English version http://clearwisdom.net (authoritative and “official” 
Falun Gong website based in the US) 
www.falundafa.org (provides links to other major websites of Falun Gong, including a 
comprehensive listing of Falun Gong websites around the world, see 
http://www.falundafa.org/eng/local.htm) 
www.faluninfo.net  
www.pureinght.net  
  
